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A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation
A growing body of empirical research
has documented persistent divisions
among American workers: divisions by
race, sex, educational credentials, industry
grouping, and so forth (F. B. Weisskoff,
B. Bluestone, S. Bowles and H. Gintis,
D. Gordon, 1971 and 1972, B. Harrison,
M. Reich, H. Wachtel and C. Betsey,
and H. Zellner). These groups seem to
operate in different labor markets, with
different working conditions, different
promotional
opportunities,
different
wages, and different market institutions.
These continuing labor market divisions
pose anomalies for neoclassical economists.
Orthodox theory assumes that profitmaximizing employers evaluate workers
in terms of their individual characteristics
and predicts that labor market differences
among groups will decline over time because of competitive mechanisms (K.
Arrow). But by most measures, the labor
market differences among groups have
not been disappearing (R. Edwards, M.
Reich, and T. Weisskopf, chs. 5, 7, 8).
The continuing importance of groups in
the labor market thus is neither explained nor predicted by orthodox theory.
Why is the labor force in general still
so fragmented? Why are group characteristics repeatedly so important in the
labor market? I n this paper, we sum-
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marize an emerging radical theory of labor
market segmentation; we develop the
full arguments in Reich, Gordon, and
Edwards. The theory argues that political
and economic forces within American
capitalism have given rise to and perpetuated segmented labor markets, and
that it is incorrect to view the sources of
segmented markets as exogenous to the
economic system.
Present Labor Market Segmentation

We define labor market segmentation
as the historical process whereby politicaleconomic forces encourage the division of
the labor market into separate submarkets,
or segments, distinguished by different
labor market characteristics and behavioral rules. Segmented labor markets
are thus the outcome of a segmentation
process. Segments may cut horizontally
across the occupational hierarchy as well
as vertically. We suggest that present
labor market conditions can most usefully
be understood as the outcome of four segmentation processes.
1. Segmentation into Primary
and Secondary Markets
The primary and secondary segments,
to use the terminology of dual labor
market theory, are differentiated mainly
by stability characteristics. Primary jobs
require and develop stable working habits ;
skills are often acquired on the job ; wages
are relatively high; and job ladders exist.
Secondary jobs do not require and often
discourage stable working habits; wages
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are low; turnover is high; and job ladders
are few. Secondary jobs are mainly
(though not exclusively) filled by minority
workers, women, and youth.
2. Segmentation Within the
Primary Sector
Within the primary sector we see a segmentation between what we call "subordinate" and "independent" primary
jobs. Subordinate primary jobs are routinized and encourage personality characteristics of dependability, discipline,
responsiveness to rules and authority, and
acceptance of a firm's goals. Both factory
and office jobs are present in this segment.
I n contrast, independent primary jobs encourage and require creative, problemsolving, self-initiating characteristics and
often have professional standards for
work. Voluntary turnover is high and individual motivation and achievement are
highly rewarded.
3. Segmentation by Race
While minority workers are present in
secondary, subordinate primary and independent primary segments they often
face distinct segments within those submarkets. Certain jobs are "race-typed,"
segregated by prejudice and by labor
market institutions. Geographic separation plays an important role in maintaining divisions between race segments.

4. Segmentation by Sex
Certain jobs have generally been restricted to men; others to women. Wages
in the female segment are usually lower
than in comparable male jobs; female jobs
often require and encourage a "serving
mentalityv-an orientation toward providing services to other people and particularly to men. These characteristics are
encouraged by family and schooling institutions.
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The Historical Origins of Labor
Market Segmentation

The present divisions of the labor
market are best understood from an historical analysis of their origins. We argue
that segmentation arose during the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. Our historical analysis focuses on
the era of monopoly capitalism, from
roughly 1890 to the present, with special
emphasis on the earlier transitional years.
During the preceding period of competitive capitalism, labor market developments pointed toward the progressive
homogenizatiorc of the labor force, not
toward segmentation. The factory system
eliminated many skilled craft occupations,
creating large pools of semiskilled jobs
(N. Ware). Production for a mass market
and increased mechanization forged standardized work requirements. Large establishments drew greater numbers of
workers into common working environments.
The increasingly homogeneous and proletarian character of the work force generated tensions which were manifest in
the tremendous upsurge in labor conflict
that accompanied the emergence of monopoly capitalism: in railroads dating
back to 1877, in steel before 1901 and
again in 1919, in coal mining during and
after the First World War, in textile mills
throughout this period, and in countless
other plants and industries around the
country. The success of the Industrial
Workers of the World ( I W W ) , the emergence of a strong Socialist party, the
general (as opposed to industry-specific)
strikes in Seattle and New Orleans, the
mass labor revolts in 1919 and 1920, and
the increasingly national character of the
labor movement throughout this period
indicated a widespread and growing opposition to capitalist hegemony in general.
More and more, strikes begun "simply"
over wage issues often escalated to much
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more general issues (J. Brecher, J.
Commons).
At the same time that the work force
was becoming more homogeneous, those
oligopolistic corporations that still dominate the economy today began to emerge
and to consolidate their power. The captains of the new monopoly capitalist era,
now released from short-run competitive
pressures and in search of long-run stability, turned to the capture of strategic
control over product and factor markets.
Their new concerns were the creation and
exploitation of monopolistic control, rather
than the allocational calculus of short-run
profit-maximization. (For examples see
A. Chandler, B. Emmet and J. Jeuck, R.
Hidy and M. Hidy, and A. Nevins.)
The new needs of monopoly capitalism
for control were threatened by the consequences of homogenization and proletarianization of the work force. Evidence
abounds that large corporations were
painfully aware of the potentially revolutionary character of these movements. As
Commons notes, the employers' "mass
offensive'' on unions between 1903 and
1908 was more of an ideological crusade
than a matter of specific demands. The
simultaneous formation of the National
Civic Federation (NCF), a group dominated by large "progressive" capitalists,
was another explicit manifestation of the
fundamental crises facing the capitalist
class (J. Weinstein). The historical analysis which follows suggests that to meet
this threat employers actively and consciously fostered labor market segmentation in order to "divide and conquer"
the labor force. Moreover, the efforts of
monopolistic corporations to gain greater
control of their product markets led to a
dichotomization of the industrial structure which had the indirect and unintended, though not undesired, effect of
reinforcing their conscious strategies. Thus
labor market segmentation arose both
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from conscious strategies and systemic
forces.
Conscious Ejorts
Monopoly capitalist corporations devised deliberate strategies to resolve the
contradictions between the increased proletarianization of the work force and the
growth and consolidation of concentrated
corporate power. The central thrust of
the new strategies was to break down the
increasingly unified worker interests that
grew out of the proletarianization of work
and the concentration of workers in urban
areas. As exhibited in several aspects of
these large firms' operations, this effort
aimed to divide the labor force into various
segments so that the actual experiences of
workers were different and the basis of
their common opposition to capitalists
undermined.
The first element in the new strategy involved the internal relations of the firm.
The tremendous growth in the size of
monopoly capitalist work forces, along
with the demise of craft-governed production, necessitated a change in the
authority relations upon which control in
the firm rested (R. Edwards). Efforts
toward change in this area included
Taylorism and Scientific Management, the
establishment of personnel departments,
experimentation with different organizational structures, the use of industrial
psychologists, "human relations experts"
We have paid more attention in this brief summary
to employers' conscious efforts because the other papers
presented in this session provide a complementary emphasis on systemic forces. We fully develop both explanations in Reich, Gordon, and Edwards.
These efforts were "conscious" in the following
sense. Capitalists faced immediate problems and events
and devised strategies to meet them. Successful strategies survived and were copied. These efforts were not
"conscious" in the sense that those who undertook them
understood fully the historical forces acting upon them
or all the ramifications of their policies. As we argue in
the text, in certain cases capitalists acted out of a
broader class consciousness.
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and others to devise appropriate "motivating" incentives, and so forth (L.
Baritz, A. Chandler, S. Marglin and F.
Miller and M. Coghill). From this effort
emerged the intensification of hierarchical
control, particularly the "bureaucratic
form" of modern corporations. I n the
steel industry, for example, a whole new
system of stratified jobs was introduced
shortly after the formation of U.S. Steel
(K. Stone). The effect of bureaucratization was to establish a rigidly graded
hierarchy of jobs and power by which
"top-down" authority could be exercised.
The restructuring of the internal relations of the firm furthered labor market
segmentation through the creation of segmented "internal labor markets." Job
ladders were created, with definite "entrylevel" jobs and patterns of promotion.
White-collar workers entered the firm's
work force and were promoted within it in
different ways from the blue-collar production force. Workers not having the
qualifications for particular entry-level
jobs were excluded from access to that entire job ladder. In response, unions often
sought to gain freedom from the arbitrary
discretionary power of supervisors by demanding a seniority criterion for promotion. I n such cases, the union essentially
took over the management of the internal
labor markets: they agreed to allocate
workers and discipline recalcitrants, helping legitimize the internal market in return for a degree of control over its operation (P. Doeringer and M. Piore).
One such effort a t internal control
eventually resulted in segmentation by
industry. Firms had initially attempted to
raise the cost to workers of leaving individual companies (but not the cost of
entering) by restricting certain benefits
to continued employment in that company. Part of this strategy was "welfare
capitalism" which emerged from the NCF
in particular, and achieved most pro-
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nounced form in the advanced industries.
At Ford, for example, education for the
workers' children, credit, and other benefits were dependent on the workers' continued employment by the firm and therefore tied the worker more securely to the
firm. For these workers, the loss of one's
job meant a complete disruption in all
aspects of the family's life. Likewise,
seniority benefits were lost when workers
switched companies (Weinstein). As industrial unions gained power, they transformed some of these firm-specific benefits
to industry-wide privileges. The net effect
was an intensification not only of internal
segmentation, but also of segmentation by
industry, which, as we discuss in the next
section, had other origins as well.
At the same time that firms were segmenting their internal labor markets, similar efforts were under way with respect
to the firm's external relations. Employers
quite consciously exploited race, ethnic,
and sex antagonisms in order to undercut
unionism and break strikes. I n numerous
instances during the consolidation of
monopoly capitalism, employers manipulated the mechanisms of labor supply in
order to import blacks as strikebreakers,
and racial hostility was stirred up to deflect class conflicts into race conflicts. For
example, during the steel strike of 1919,
one of the critical points in U.S. history,
some 30,000 to 40,000 blacks were imported as strikebreakers in a matter of a
few weeks. Employers also often transformed jobs into "female jobs" in order to
render those jobs less susceptible to
unionization (Brecher, D. Brody, Commons).
Employers also consciously manipulated
ethnic antagonisms to achieve segmentation. Employers often hired groups from
rival nationalities in the same plant or in
different plants. During labor unrest the
companies sent spies and rumor mongers
to each camp, stirring up fears, hatred,
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and antagonisms of other groups. The
strategy was most successful when many
immigrant groups had little command of
English (Brecher, Brody) .
The manipulation of ethnic differences
was, however, subject to two grave limitations as a tool in the strategy of "divide
and conquer." First, increasing English
literacy among immigrants allowed them
to communicate more directly with each
other; second, mass immigration ended in
1924. Corporations then looked to other
segmentations of more lasting significance.
Employers also tried to weaken the
union movement by favoring the conservative "business-oriented" craft unions
against the newer "social-oriented" industrial unions. An ideology of corporate
liberalism toward labor was articulated
around the turn of the century in the
NCF. Corporate liberalism recognized
the potential gains of legitimizing some
unions but not others; the NCF worked
jointly with the craft-dominated American
Federation of Labor to undermine the
more militant industrial unions, the Socialist party, and the I W W (Weinstein).
As the period progressed, employers
also turned to a relatively new divisive
means, the use of educational "credentials." For the first time, educational
credentials were used to regularize skill requirements for jobs. Employers played an
active role in molding educational institutions to serve these channeling functions.
The new requirements helped maintain
the somewhat artificial distinctions between factory workers and those in
routinized office jobs and helped generate
some strong divisions within the office between semiskilled white-collar workers
and their more highly skilled office mates
(Bowles, Bowles and Gintis, Cohen and
Lazerson and Edwards).
Systemic Forces

The rise of giant corporations and the

emergence of a monopolistic core in the
economy sharply accentuated some systemic market forces that stimulated and
reinforced segmentation. As different firms
and industries grew a t different rates, a
dichotomization of industrial structure developed (R. Averitt, T. Vietorisz and B.
Harrison, and J. OIConnor). The larger,
more capi tal-in tensive firms were generally
sheltered by barriers to entry, enjoyed
technological, market power, and financial
economies of scale and generated higher
rates of profit and growth than their
smaller, labor-intensive competitive counterparts. However, it did not turn out
that the monopolistic core firms were
wholly to swallow up the competitive
periphery firms.
Given their large capital investments,
the large monopolistic corporations required stable market demand and stable
planning horizons in order to insure that
their investments would not go unutilized
(J. K. Galbraith). Where demand was
cyclical, seasonal, or otherwise unstable,
production within the monopolistic environment became increasingly unsuitable. More and more, production of certain products was subcontracted or "exported" to small, more competitive and
less capital-intensive firms on the industrial periphery.
Along with the dualism in the industrial structure, there developed a corresponding dualism of working environments, wages, and mobility patterns.
Monopoly corporations, with more stable
production and sales, developed job structures and internal relations reflecting that
stability. For example, the bureaucratization of work rewarded and elicited stable
work habits in employees. I n peripheral
firms, where product demand was unstable, jobs and workers tended to be
marked also by instability. The result was
the dichotomization of the urban labor
market into "primary" and "secondary"
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sectors, as the dual labor market theory
has proposed (Gordon, 1972, Piore).
I n addition, certain systemic forces intensified segmentation within corporations in the primary sector. As Piore has
argued, the evolution of technology within
primary work places tended to promote
distinctions between jobs requiring general and specific skills. As new technologies emerged which replicated these
differential skill requirements, employers
found that they could most easily train
for particular jobs those workers who had
already developed those different kinds
of skills. As highly technical jobs evolved
in which the application of generalized,
problem-solving techniques were required,
for instance, employers found that they
could get the most out of those who had
already developed those traits. Initial
differences in productive capacities were
inevitably reinforced.
The Social Functions of
Labor Market Segmentation
As the preceding historical analysis has
argued, labor market segmentation is
intimately related to the dynamics of
monopoly capitalism. Understanding its
origins, we are now in a position to assess
its social importance.
Labor market segmentation arose and
is perpetuated because i t is functionalthat is, it facilitates the operation of
capitalist institutions. Segmentation is
functional primarily because i t helps reproduce capitalist hegemony. First, as the
historical analysis makes quite clear,
segmentation divides workers and forestalls potential movements uniting all
workers against employers. (For an interesting analysis, see C. Kerr and A.
Siegel) . Second, segmentation establishes
"fire trails" across vertical job ladders
and, to the extent that workers perceive
separate segments with different criteria
for access, workers limit their own as-
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pirations for mobility. Less pressure is
then placed on other social institutionsthe schools and the family, for examplethat reproduce the class structure. Third,
division of workers into segments legitimizes inequalities in authority and control between superiors and subordinates.
For example, institutional sexism and
racism reinforce the industrial authority
of white male foremen.
Political Implications

One of the principal barriers to united
anticapitalist opposition among workers
has been the evolution and persistence of
labor market segmentation. This segmentation underlies the current state of
variegation in class consciousness among
different groups of workers. A better understanding of the endogenous sources of
uneven levels of consciousness helps to
explain the difficulties involved in overcoming divisions among workers. Nonetheless, if we more clearly understand the
sources of our divisions, we may be able
to see more clearly how to overcome them.
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